Rankings of academic journals are increasingly important but even a rankings-oriented discipline like economics has no agreement on how aggressively lower ranked journals are down-weighted and on how wide is the universe of journals considered. Since impact factors based on citations may be easily manipulated we instead look to the academic labor market, using data on economists in the University of California system to relate their lifetime publications in 700 different academic journals to salary. We test amongst the various sets of journal rankings, to see which are most congruent with the returns implied by the academic labor market.
I. Introduction
The scholarly influence of research outputs affects decisions made by authors, universities, funding agencies and potential students. Impetus for measuring scholarly influence comes from formal research assessment exercises initiated in many countries to guide tertiary education funding and inform public perceptions of university quality.
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As publication in academic journals represents the principal research output for most academics, journal rankings have become increasingly important. While the growing coverage and ease of use of bibliometric databases is facilitating direct evaluation of individual research outputs, the use of journal rankings as a proxy for the value of published research remains the basis for many assessments of the research outputs of departments and individuals (e.g., Combes and Linnemer, 2003; Kalaitzidakis et al, 2003; Coupé, 2003; and Macri and Sinha, 2006) .
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Impact factors based on citations have become the most widely used indicator of journal quality.
3
The most common is the Two Year Impact Factor; the total citations by all journals in a database in a particular year to papers published in the journal considered over the previous two years, divided by the two-year total of papers in that journal. 4 Following the path-breaking work by Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) , journal rankings in economics generally weight citations by an assessment of the quality of the source journal to provide adjusted impact factors.
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Widely used examples of this approach include Laband and Piette (1994) , Kalaitzidias et al (1999 Kalaitzidias et al ( , 2003 Kalaitzidias et al ( and 2011 , Koydrzki and Yu (2006) and recursive impact factors from RePEc. 6 Combes and
Linnemer (2010) provide assessment measures for all journals in EconLit based on a hybrid of direct and adjusted citation based rankings, regression analysis and imposed assumptions about the desired convexity or quality aggressiveness of the journal quality weights.
The growing reliance on impact factors may encourage strategic behavior. For example, editors may coerce authors to add citations to their journals. Wilhite and Fong (2012) find 175 coercing journals in their survey of researchers in economics, sociology, psychology and For example, since VGTU managed to lift two of their journals into the top ten in economics, cross-citations between these two would not be ruled out and would be from journals that are themselves highly ranked. Moreover, individual authors could form cross-citation clubs to raise their personal citation counts and h-index (the author has written h papers that are each cited at least h times), which also inflate the impact factors of the journals they publish in. These individual clubs would be harder to detect than the Lithuanian-based cross-citation club described above.
Common alternatives to impact factors, such as defining the 'best' journals as those where people in the best departments publish, run the risk of circularity, since the best departments are often defined as those publishing in the best journals. Moreover, reputational rankings are inherently backward looking and ossify a group of journals that once were best 7 See also the supporting analysis available from www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/335/6068/542/DC1. 8 The VGTU journals and their citations to TEDE are: Technological and Economic Development of Economy (that is, journal self-citations) (138), Journal of Business Economics and Management (70) , International Journal of Strategic Property Management (50), Transport (45), and Journal of Civil Engineering and Management (44) . 9 For a discussion of measures of "citation inflation" from journal self-citation see Chang, McAleer and Oxley (2011) . For the 40 economics journals they consider self-citation rates vary between 0 and 99% of non-self citations.
while failing to acknowledge the rise of dynamic new journals. Given the disruption to the world economy from the rise of China, India, Korea and other countries, it would be surprising if there
were not a similar disruption to the global hierarchy of economics journals from this reordering of the leading nations. Hence, what is required is a robust measure of journal impacts which is not easily manipulated and which can be applied in a non-parochial manner.
In this paper we use academic labor market data to sift between different rankings of economics journals. The basis of our approach is that for research intensive universities, hiring, promotion and salary advancement is likely to be directly related to perceived research impacts.
While citations can be manipulated, when faculty debate merits of publication in one journal or another during salary deliberations, they are choosing over actions with costly consequences and so the signals provided by these decisions should be less prone to strategic manipulation. In our specific example, we relate salaries of economists in the University of California system to their lifetime publications in 700 different academic journals. These data enable us to test amongst various sets of competing journal rankings, looking in particular at the revealed convexity or aggressiveness of the weightings as they are applied to perceived quality of the journal. We also examine whether the academic labor market discounts older articles.
While there is a substantial empirical literature on the academic labor market, especially for economists, this research has not focused on uncovering measures of journal quality.
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Instead, academic earnings equations have been used to consider the negative impact of seniority (Ransom, 1993; Moore et al, 1998; Bratsberg et al, 2003 and , the returns to co-authorship (Sauer, 1988; Moore et al, 2001; Hilmer and Hilmer, 2005; Hilmer et al, 2011) , and the returns to the quantity versus the quality of research, with citations typically a proxy for quality and article counts a proxy for quantity (Hamermesh et al, 1982; Hilmer et al, 2011) .
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The question of quantity versus quality is revisited by Hamermesh and Pfann (2012) , who find that both matter to salary whereas citations (quality) are an important determinant of reputation (using Nobel prizes, Clark medals, Econometric Society fellowships and departmental reputation as proxies) but the quantum of publications is not.
The closest study in the literature to the present paper is Ellison (2010) , who examines a particular academic labor market outcome -which young economists (a PhD since 1988) had 10 Coupé (2003) provides a somewhat dated review of research on the market for academic economists. 11 Academic earnings equations have also been used to compare returns to research productivity between countries (Moore et al, 2007) and to compare rankings of departments (Gibson, 2000) . "…I propose that a useful criterion for assessing competing indexes (and for assessing whether the indexes have any value at all) is to examine whether they are consistent with labor market outcomes." (Ellison, 2010, p.1) While Ellison (2010) does not examine journal rankings, the same logic of seeking congruence with labor market data can be applied to sifting between the various journal ranking schemes, using information from salary decisions that have costly consequences. Our focus on journal rankings rather than citations is because the time lag from publication to receiving citations is impractical for research assessment exercises that often examine just the last six years (Tressler and Anderson, 2012) . For this reason, journal quality measures remain widely used as a proxy for the value of published research, not just in tea room conversations but also when universities make forward-looking decisions on hiring, tenure, promotion and salary increases.
II. Journal Assessment Measures
This section outlines key characteristics of some representative journal assessment measures that have been used in the economics literature. An illustration of their implications is provided by applying them to economists in the University of California system. Laband and Piette (1994) ("LP94" below) apply the pioneering methodology of Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) , where adjusted impact factors are determined by using the sum of citations to each journal in an iterative process. The adjusted impact factors are used to weight the citation sources and to provide journal weights. This approach is sometimes referred to as an Eigenfactor approach. The ISI Journal Citation Reports provide the database of articles published in 1990 and their citations to papers published from [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . Only 130 economics journals are given weights in the Laband and Piette scheme, which is the least permissive of any scheme considered here. 12 The original Hirsch index is defined as the largest number h such that the author has written h papers that are each cited at least h times. Ellison (2010) introduces a generalised form of the Hirsch index and finds that labor market outcomes support the case for a version that places more emphasis on a smaller number of more highly cited papers. Kodrzycki and Yu (2006) also apply the Liebowitz and Palmer methodology, but adjust for the citing intensity of sub-disciplines. While also using the ISI Journal Citation Reports, they develop a list of journals commonly used by economists, rather than relying primarily on the ISI list of economics journals. Unlike Liebowitz and Palmer and Laband and Piette, they consider citations from all social science journals, to provide one set of journal assessment measures ("K&Y_all" below), and citations from those journals they classified as economics journals for a second set of measures ("K&Y_econ" below). The Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) website provides a number of different journal impact assessments using the RePEc citation database.
The assessment measure used in this paper is the basic impact factor based on direct citations, which is corrected for self-cites to journals, but not self-cites to an author's own papers. This is one of the most permissive schemes, in that impact factors are provided for 984 journals.
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The other permissive ranking, in the sense of trying to not exclude any economics journal, is from Combes and Linnemer (2010) . These authors use a number of approaches in order to cover all EconLit journals. They start with 304 journals drawn from EconLit and the ISI Journal Citation Reports, then combine several citation indices, adjusted for the field of specialization, and use a Google Scholar h-index to regress their index on Google Scholar citation data to extrapolate it to all EconLit journals. Assessment measures are proposed based on assumptions 13 Kodczychi and Yu also provide assessment measures based on citations from a set of journals they refer to as "policy" oriented, which we do not use in this paper. 14 This is an update of the widely used Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003) about the degree of convexity or quality aggressiveness desired. We use the Combes and
Linnemer "medium" convexity measure and the "high" convexity measure ("CLm" and "CLh" below). These assessment measures are available for 1168 journals.
The difference between the "medium" and the "high" convexity measures is illustrated in Figure 1 , for the top 102 journals in the Combes-Linnemer scheme. These comprise their 'AAA', 'AA' and 'A' groups, with the bottom ranked journal in the 'A' group being Applied Economics.
The "medium" and "high" convexity indexes are similar for the top four journals but then a large The final approach to ranking journals we consider gives an alternative to using citations.
Instead, Mason, Steagall and Fabritius (1997) This ranking has a relatively low degree of convexity, in the sense of not heavily penalizing lower ranked journals. 17 But these reputational weights are only available for 142 journals so MSF is the second least permissive of the schemes that we consider.
It is clear from this discussion that journal assessment schemes differ in three main ways:
the ranking of journals, the degree of coverage or non-zero weights, and the convexity of the weights applied. We illustrate these aspects by applying each of the nine schemes considered to the lifetime publications by the University of California economists in our sample (described 17 For example, the relative weight for the Southern Economic Journal compared with the AER is from 0.02 to 0.20, with an average of 0.12, for eight of the nine schemes that we use. But the MSF scheme gives it a weight of 0.73. below). Applying these schemes to the output of actual economists helps show the important impact of coverage assumptions. In fact, the two least permissive schemes (MSF and LP94)
would exclude over one-third of the academic articles published by economists working in economics departments in the largest research-intensive public university system in the United
States (Table 1) . It is unclear that the academic labor market also places zero value on publication in these excluded journals. Even the most permissive schemes that attempt to cover the universe of economics journals (RePEc and Combes-Linnemer) would miss over one-tenth of the articles published by these economists.
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( Table 1 about here)
To show the convexity of each scheme we estimate: log(relative weight)=α+βlog(rank),
where the relative weight=1.0 for the highest ranked journal and the regressions are estimated on the non-zero weighted journals published in by the academics in our sample. The rank elasticities
in Table 1 range from -0.22, for the least aggressive scheme (MSF), to -1.92, for the most convex (LP94). It is clear that CLh is hardly the most convex of the schemes, with four others having a more elastic response of journal weights to rank (K&Y_all, K&Y_econ, KMS and LP94). These same four schemes also exclude at least one-quarter of lifetime articles, so they can be considered to be especially aggressive in their focus on perceived journal quality.
The final column of Table 1 reports the average lifetime weighted journal output of the economists in our sample, in terms of AER-sized pages (using 1/n for co-authored papers). This is the key variable which will be used to explain academic salaries, and it varies from 144 pages under the MSF journal rankings to just 36 pages with the LP94 weights. This four-fold difference should be large enough to allow the salary data to discriminate between the various schemes, which are ranked in Table 1 from least aggressive to most aggressive, in terms of the combined impact of the assumptions about non-coverage and convexity.
III. Data
Our approach of using labor market data to uncover the implied quality of academic journals can be applied to any group of academics, in any discipline in any country. We decided to focus on economists within economics departments in the nine campuses of the University of California 18 These are all academic articles, as captured in the union of the EconLit, RePEc and Web of Science databases, so the under-coverage of articles is not because they are not part of the peer-reviewed scientific literature.
system for three reasons. First, the public disclosure database of California state worker salaries (http://www.sacbee.com/statepay/) is unusually detailed, as we describe below. Second, this
gives us a well-defined target sample frame that is likely to be of inherent interest -the largest research-intensive public university system in the United States. While the salary returns to various journals may differ in private universities or in other public systems, for the first study of journal rankings using salary data it makes sense to start with the largest system (that is, there is good external validity in studying the University of California). Third, while all University of California campuses are research-intensive, they span the perceived quality range from excellent (e.g. Berkeley), to very good (e.g. Davis) to those that are less highly ranked (e.g. Riverside) and emerging (e.g. Merced). This range of quality allows us to test if some journal ranking schemes do a better job of matching labor market outcomes in the best departments.
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In order for labor market data to provide a valid signal of perceived journal quality, the sample has to be relatively homogeneous in terms of the weight placed on research performance in salary determination. So we excluded anyone with significant non-department administrative responsibilities (e.g. Deans) and those with primarily teaching roles (including affiliated faculty, adjuncts and those obviously on part-time contracts). While economists infiltrate many other departments we did not consider those for our sample since the returns to publishing in particular economics journals may differ in, say, an agricultural economics department or even in an economics department in the business school. These restrictions left us with a sample of 223 and while this is smaller than in many other studies using academic earnings equations, it has the advantage of being for a well-defined population of interest rather than simply a hodge-podge of universities with publicly available salary data.
The salary data are unusually detailed, with the base salary reported for 2007, 2009 and 2010 and the total salary reported for those three years and also for 2008. Total salary is more temporally volatile than base salary, with squared deviations of annual salary around the multiyear mean for an individual being 32 percent higher, on average, when using total salary rather than base salary.
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When we calculate the ratio of total salary to base salary for each individual, 19 Combes and Linnemer (2010) suggest that their high convexity index "is useful to compare the best departments" (p.2), while their medium convexity index is better suited to study middle ranked departments. 20 This calculation is limited to individuals with three years of data for each type of salary and with no decline in base salary over time (which may signal only a partial year's employment as could occur from someone moving to another position). For these individuals, the squared deviation of annual salary from the three-year average has a mean (median) of $1443 ($312) for total salary and $1093 ($213) for base salary (all in millions).
this varies from 0.8 to 2.7, suggesting that the total salary received in any year may not be a good guide to the long-run 'permanent' salary. Moreover, while the total-to-base ratio averages 1.10 across all three years, it fell from 1.14 in 2007 to 1.07 in 2010, presumably because the worsening financial position of the State of California meant that cuts were being made in extraordinary salary payments. For these reasons we use the base salary rather than the total salary.
Another helpful feature of the salary data provided by the Sacramento Bee website is that details are provided on the nature of the employment contract, in terms of the pay period. Almost all academics in economics departments at the University of California are on academic year rather than financial year contracts (in contrast to, say, those in agricultural economics departments). In a few cases, especially at UC Berkeley, some economists are on law school scales, so we include a dummy variable in our regressions for individuals whose reported salary is not for a standard scale and 9-month academic year. In contrast, some previous studies of faculty salaries have had to drop individuals for whom it was unclear if their reported salaries were on a 9-month academic year basis (Hamermesh and Pfann, 2012) .
In addition to salaries we gathered data on gender, the year of first appointment and of hire at the current department, the year of obtaining a PhD (and the department and university) and whether the current appointment was named (such as an endowed or distinguished chair).
These details were available from departmental web pages and on-line CVs for most academics and otherwise we obtained them from dissertation databases and from changes in affiliations on journal articles to date movements. The on-line CVs also provided the initial information on publications, which were supplemented with searches of EconLit, RePEc and the Web of Science.
Measuring the research outputs of academics with common names can be difficult, but with so many of the sample having their CVs on-line it helped cross-validate the database search results.
We restrict attention to articles that were actually published (with pagination) by the end of 2010.
Since our focus is on journal articles, we did not include book reviews, book chapters, editorial introductions or conference proceedings. 21 The one exception is AER Papers and Proceedings (even though many CVs listed this in the 'non-refereed' section) because seven of the journal assessment schemes make no distinction between the May issue of the AER and other issues, while LP94 weight the May issue at one-quarter of ordinary issues. Only KMS give Papers and Proceedings a weight of zero. In total, our procedures recorded 5,721 articles in 700 different journals that the 223 economists in our sample had published in over their careers.
Appendix Table 1 presents definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in the academic earnings equations. The dependent variable is (log) base salary in 2010, with a mean for the underlying salary data of $156,700 and a range from $78,000 to $310,000 (the maximum total salary is $458,900). 22 The average economist in the sample had spent 12.2 years at the current university and 18 years at all appointments. One-sixth of the sample is female. Three indicator variables for atypical salary levels (and potentially influential data points) are included:
whether the academic is on a non-standard contract, whether they have a named position (which may provide funds for additional salary) and whether they are a Nobel Prize winner (only one individual). Finally, three indicators of PhD quality are also included: the rank of the PhDgranting department in either the 1995 National Research Council rankings or the Amir and
Knauff (2008) rankings, and an indicator for those economists whose PhD was not from an economics department.
IV. Results
The first step in our analysis is to obtain a well-specified academic earnings equation to then use as the testing ground for comparing each journal ranking scheme. In Table 2 we report the results of various specifications which suggest the following: indicators of quality for the PhD-granting department are not relevant to salary for this sample (columns (1) to (3)); all three of the indicators that we use for atypical salary levels (and potentially influential data points) are statistically significant (columns (4) to (6)); the effects of seniority and experience on salary are best modeled as quadratics; there is weak evidence of a premium for males; and, location fixed effects are highly significant. Based on these observations, the equation in column (7) of Table 2 is used as the base specification, to which we will then add an output variable measuring lifetime publications in journals, as weighted under each of the nine assessment schemes. Even without the output variable, the base specification explains 72 percent of the variation in log salary, which is higher than the predictive power of academic earnings equations in other studies.
( We can also compare R 2 since all the equations have the same number of explanatory variables.
The maximized R 2 and log-likelihood, and the minimized loss of information, is for the earnings equation that uses CLm -the medium convexity weights of Combes and Linnemer (2010) . Even though the MSF weights are the second least permissive, in excluding one-third of the lifetime articles published by this sample, they provide the second best congruence with the labor market data. The greatest loss of information comes from using the KMS weights, which are the second most convex and the third least permissive.
( Table 3 about here)
Our focus is on which journal ranking scheme is most congruent with the salary data, but it is also worth interpreting the magnitudes of some of the regression coefficients. Using the bestfitting model, the coefficient on the output measure suggests that a 10-page article would raise salary by 1.3 percent, which is an increase of $2090 at the mean. With a 40-year career and a five percent discount rate, for the average economist in the sample (who is 18 years into their career)
such an article would have a net present value of just over $27,500. Amongst the other variables previously identified from the specification search in Table 2 , all are statistically significant at conventional levels except for Male (which has t-statistics between 1.0 and 1.5). The location fixed effects are smaller than in Table 2 , suggesting that some of the apparent salary premium at UC Berkeley was productivity-related, but all remain statistically significant. 24 The quadratics suggest that for the average economist, salary is maximized after 30 years of labor market experience and minimized after 27 years of seniority at the current university.
Formal Non-nested Tests
Non-nested tests can help formally discriminate between the competing models in Table 3 .
These test the validity of one linear model, H 0 as opposed to its non-nested alternative H 1 :
where X and Z are matrices of explanatory variables, and neither is a linear combination of the other, β and γ are corresponding parameter vectors, and ε 0 and ε l are random errors. Forming a 'compound' model with each competing measure of lifetime output included at the same time is not advisable because of possible multicollinearity. Moreover, this artificial nesting approach does not distinguish between H 0 and H 1 ; instead, it distinguishes between each competing model and a hybrid (Greene, 2012) . This can be seen by writing the compound model as:
where X holds the set of variables in X not in Z, Z holds the set of variables in Z not in X, and W has the variables common to the two models. While the test of 0  γ might seem to reject H 1 and 0  β might reject H 0 , since δ remains a mixture of parts of β and γ it is not established by the F-test on the compound model that either of these parts is zero (Greene, 2012 The pairwise comparisons of each model, using Vuong's test to see which is closer to the truth, are reported in Table 4 . For ease of interpretation, the models are ordered with those using the least aggressive weighting schemes listed first. The format of the table is that each cell contains a bilateral z-statistic test result, with significant positive values counting as evidence in favor of the model in the column against the model in the row and negative values counting as evidence for the row model against the column model. The model that uses CLm, the medium convexity weights of Combes and Linnemer, is favored against all of the competing models except for the one using MSF weights, for which the comparison is inconclusive (z=-1.40). The comparison of models that use the CLm and CLh weights to calculate lifetime output yields a significant rejection of the high convexity weights (z=2.27), which is notable since there is no difference in coverage between these rankings. The only other significant results in the table are that the model using KMS weights is rejected against the model using CLh weights, and also weakly rejected against the model using MSF weights (at p=0.052).
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( Table 4 about here)
The results in Table 4 suggest the less aggressive journal weighting schemes are most congruent with salaries of University of California economists. To see how robust this finding is, Cox-Pesaran tests were carried out to compare the models using CLm and CLh weights, and those using MSF, KMS and LP94 weights, since these capture the extremes in terms of least and 25 The model using Coupé weights is also weakly rejected against the model using MSF weights (at p=0.099).
most aggressive down-weighting for lower ranked journals. The model using CLh weights is rejected against the one using CLm weights (p=0.00) while there is no reverse rejection (p=0.30).
Similarly, the model using LP94 weights is rejected against the model using CLm weights (p=0.00) but not the reverse (p=0.26). When the least aggressive MSF weights are used, the model using KMS weights (the second most aggressive) is rejected against it (p=0.00) while there is no reverse rejection (p=0.23), and the models with MSF weights and LP94 weights reject against each other. Thus the congruence of the less aggressive journal weighting schemes with the salary data appears to be a robust finding that does not depend on using just one type of nonnested test.
Should Older Articles be Discounted?
The and the age discount factor, δ varied from 0 to 2, in increments of 0.1. In other words, we allowed for no age discounting (δ=0), for inverse age discounting (δ=1) where a 20-year old article has 1/20 th the impact on current salary of a 1-year old article, and for a variety of more extreme and intermediate cases.
The best-fitting model, using CLm weights, was estimated for each of these 21 values of δ and the maximized log-likelihoods are compared in Figure 2 . There appears to be weak age discounting, with the log-likelihood maximized at δ=0.4, which is four-points above the value at δ=0. The maximized likelihood declines steeply at higher discount rates. The full set of estimation results is reported in Appendix Table 3 and the results of the Vuong non-nested tests are in Table 5 .
( Table 5 about here)
The salary data continue to favor the less aggressive journal weighting schemes when age-discounting of articles is allowed for. The model using the least aggressive MSF weights previously weakly rejected against two models but it now rejects against four (KMS, Coupé and both Kodrzycki and Yu schemes) . Similarly the model with CLm weights now rejects against six models (and against the model using Coupé weights at p=0.118). Moreover, the models using six of the assessment schemes now reject against the model using the KMS weights (which are the second most aggressive), whereas previously only three models rejected against this scheme. The final change caused by allowing age discounting is that the model using the simple RePEc impact factors now rejects against three others (both Kodrzycki and Yu schemes and KMS) whereas previously that model rejected against no others.
Are Results Different for the Best Departments?
Combes and Linnemer (2010) suggest that their high convexity weights are useful to compare the best departments while their medium convexity index is suitable for middle ranked departments. We therefore examine whether the finding that the salary data favor less convex journal weights for calculating lifetime output is also found if we restrict attention just to the top four economics departments in the University of California system: Berkeley, San Diego, Davis and Los Angeles. In keeping with the results on age discounting, the lifetime output is calculated using the inverse of the square root of the age of each article. The full set of estimation results is reported in Appendix Table 4 and the results of the Vuong non-nested tests for the sub-sample of academics in the best four departments are in Table 6 .
( Table 6 about here)
There is no evidence that salaries of academics in the best four departments are better explained by more convex journal weighting schemes. In fact, the Vuong tests suggest that the model using the least convex MSF weights now rejects against six of the other models (being inconclusive only against the models with CLm and LP94 weights). Moreover, the Cox-Pesaran test suggests that the model using LP94 weights is rejected against the model using MSF weights (p=0.00) but the reverse rejection is only weakly significant (p=0.07). The other change between Table 5 and Table 6 is that the model using the Coupé weights, which are the third least convex, now rejects against two of the models using more convex weights (K&Y_all and KMS) whereas previously it only rejected against the model using KMS weights. Finally, in terms of the specific claim of Combes and Linnemer that their high convexity weights are most suitable for comparing the best departments, the salary evidence suggests the opposite. Under both the Vuong test (z=3.00) and the Cox-Pesaran test (p=0.00) the model using CLh weights is significantly rejected against the model using CLm weights.
What Weight should be placed on AER Papers and Proceedings?
The The salary data suggest that treating one page in the Papers and Proceedings issue as equivalent to 58 percent of a page in the other issues of the AER is most appropriate. Thus journal assessment schemes that do not discriminate between the May issue and other issues (likely because they rely on ISI data that do not distinguish journal issue numbers when counting citations) would seem to overstate the impact of Papers and Proceedings. On the other hand, the two assessment schemes that do discriminate may have down-weighted Papers and Proceedings too heavily. Nevertheless we caution that the difference in the maximized log-likelihoods is very small, across any of the values of the relative weight term for Papers and Proceedings. These small differences suggest that even for journals in which our sample have published a large number of articles, deriving journal-specific impact factors from the salary data -what might be dubbed "Market Impact Factors" -would be difficult. While we have statistical power to discriminate between different schemes for weighting the entire spectrum of journals, to derive valuations for individual journals would likely take a far larger sample.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have compared nine different sets of economics journal assessment measures to find which is most consistent with labor market outcomes. These journal assessment measures differ according to the ranking of journals, the degree of coverage, and the convexity of the weights applied. The most aggressive schemes, in terms of either ignoring or down-weighting lower ranked journals, exclude more than one-quarter of the lifetime output of our sample of University of California economists. The aggressive schemes also imply a very substantial penalty for publishing in lower ranked journals; for example, an article in a journal like Economic Inquiry that is just outside the top 50 journals is equivalent to less than ten percent of a similarly-sized article in the American Economic Review or the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
The clear picture that emerges from the empirical results is that the labor market does not reward publication in ways consistent with the weights implied by the most aggressive journal assessment measures. Instead, it is when lifetime output is weighted according to the least convex schemes, such as those of Mason, Steagall and Fabritius (1997) and the CLm index of Combes and Linnemer (2010) , that the greatest congruence with academic salaries is found. This finding is robust to different assumptions about the age discounting of articles and also holds if we restrict attention just to the best departments. Indeed, this last result, that a model using high convexity weights is rejected against a less convex alternative if tested on the top four University of California economics departments is contrary to the claim of Combes and Linnemer (2010) that a high convexity index is more suited for comparing the best departments.
We view this congruence with labor market information as an important criterion for the reasonableness of a journal ranking scheme. While highly convex journal ranking schemes can be derived from citation data, such data may be manipulated by editors who coerce authors to add superfluous citations and by authors and editors who collude in cross-citation clubs to raise the citation counts for particular journals or particular individuals. In contrast, labor market decisions have costly consequences, so the preference for convexity (or lack of) in journal ranking schemes that is revealed by labor market outcomes is a pattern that comes from information that should be less prone to strategic manipulation. Maximized Log-Likelihood Note: Author's calculations based on 5721 journal articles produced by 213 University of California economists and journal weights from the sources noted. a Estimated over the journals with non-zero weights for each scheme using log(relative weight)=α+βlog(rank). b Total number of AER-sized pages (with co-authors given 1/n) published in career through 2010, where journals are weighted such that the highest ranked journal for each scheme has weight 1.0 and there is no age-discounting for older articles. Note: The results are from nine separate regressions, where each includes all of the variables in column (7) of Table 2 plus the total number of AER-sized pages (with co-authors given 1/n) published in each economist's career through 2010, where journals are weighted such that the highest ranked journal for each scheme has weight 1.0 and there is no age-discounting for older articles. Full results of the regressions are reported in Appendix Table 2 . N=223. a The semi-elasticity shows the percentage increase in annual (academic year) salary for a 10-page increase in total career output of weighted journal articles. 
